




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Brian Wells and the collar-bomb plot

A delivery to a television tower

On August 28, 2003, a pay-phone caller ordered pizzas delivered to a remote television-tower site outside Erie. Brian Wells, a delivery driver, took the order.

At the site, conspirators attached a locked explosive collar to his neck. The federal record later described Wells as having some limited knowledge during planning while also recognizing evidence that threats made him an unwilling participant once the device was attached.

That distinction should not be forced into a single label. A person can agree to one plan and become a hostage to a lethal device. Wells's family maintained that he was an innocent victim from the beginning.

The public record supports uncertainty about his initial knowledge and strong evidence that the live device controlled his conduct during the robbery.

The bank and the demand note

Wells entered a PNC Bank wearing the collar and carrying a demand note. He sought a much larger sum than the teller could provide and left with \$8,702.

The device was visible, and the instructions attempted to make him appear both robber and captive. That design complicated the first police response.

Bank employees had to treat the threat as real while officers responding outside had to determine whether Wells could detonate the device or whether someone else controlled it.

The later conspiracy case established that the robbery and explosive were connected parts of one plan, not an improvised claim after arrest.

The scavenger route

Instructions directed Wells through a series of locations where he was supposed to find additional notes and ultimately a way to remove or neutralize the collar.

The route consumed time. Whether a successful release was ever truly possible became part of the investigation because the timer and travel demands may have made survival impossible.

Wells reached a McDonald's area and retrieved a further instruction before police detained him. Officers could not permit a bank-robbery suspect wearing an explosive to continue moving through public locations.

The same detention prevented him from following the route. That conflict does not make police responsible for the device or the timetable created by the conspirators.

Detention and explosion

Wells told officers the bomb was real and that he had been forced. Police kept distance and called the bomb squad.

Before technicians arrived, the device exploded and killed him. News video recorded the scene, creating one of the most widely circulated images associated with the case.

Public replay can obscure that Wells was a person dying under a device built and attached by others. The existence of footage does not make repeated display necessary.

The immediate investigation involved the FBI, Pennsylvania State Police, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, and

local authorities.

A conspiracy reconstructed

Investigators conducted nearly one thousand interviews and followed a large number of leads. The device, notes, pay phone, pizza order, tower site, witness relationships, and later statements had to be joined.

William Rothstein became central after contacting police about the body of James Roden, whom Marjorie Diehl-Armstrong had killed. That separate homicide opened a path into the robbery plot.

Kenneth Barnes later cooperated and described planning. Federal prosecutors alleged that Diehl-Armstrong sought robbery proceeds partly to pay for the murder of her father.

The resulting theory included Diehl-Armstrong, Barnes, Rothstein, Wells, and other people whose exact roles did not all reach trial.

Wells's disputed role

The 2007 federal indictment characterized Wells as having participated to a limited degree in planning. Prosecutors also said his role may have changed once the collar was locked and threats became real.

Members of his family rejected the claim that he knowingly joined the plot. Some trial evidence placed him in earlier discussions; other evidence supported ambush and coercion.

Because Wells died, he could not testify, confront witnesses, or be charged. No judgment convicted him of the bank robbery.

The correct account preserves the dispute. It does not call him the mastermind, and it does not claim a court found him wholly unaware from the beginning.

Federal charges and Barnes's plea

Federal prosecutors charged Diehl-Armstrong and Barnes with conspiracy, armed bank robbery, and use of a destructive device in a crime of violence.

Barnes pleaded guilty and became a government witness. A cooperating conspirator can supply inside knowledge while also having a reason to minimize his conduct and seek a reduced sentence.

His statements required corroboration through documents, physical evidence, and other testimony. A plea established his own guilt; it did not automatically decide every disputed fact about Wells.

The court imposed a lengthy federal sentence reflecting the lethal robbery plot.

Diehl-Armstrong's trial

Diehl-Armstrong was found competent to proceed after litigation over mental condition. A federal jury convicted her in 2010.

The prosecution linked her to the plan, timers, Barnes, Rothstein, and the motive involving her father. Her prior conviction for killing Roden formed part of the surrounding history but had to be admitted and used under evidentiary limits.

She received a life sentence plus additional imprisonment. The Third Circuit rejected her direct-appeal challenges, and later collateral litigation did not erase the judgment.

Diehl-Armstrong died in federal custody in 2017. Her death ended punishment but left the conviction intact.

The first hour

The federal chronology gives unusual precision to the afternoon because the device itself imposed a clock. The pizza order was placed from a pay telephone at about 1:30 p.m. Wells reached the television-tower area as part of an ordinary delivery route. At roughly 2:00, according to the indictment later summarized by the FBI, the collar was fastened and its timer started. At about 2:20 he entered the bank. He remained there for approximately twelve minutes before leaving with the money the teller could supply.

Those times are not neutral details. They show why every delay mattered and why the supposed escape game must be assessed as a mechanism of control rather than as a fair opportunity. The instructions demanded travel among fixed points while the person wearing the device had no means to inspect its internal wiring, test the timer, or know whether any promised release step was genuine. Whatever Wells understood before arriving at the tower, the locked collar created a new condition. From that moment, another person's construction determined how long he might live.

The demand for \$250,000 also belonged to the conspiracy's design. The teller did not have that amount available. Wells left with \$8,702, a fraction of the intended proceeds. That shortfall did not make the robbery less dangerous, and it did not stop the timer. It meant that the lethal plan had produced little of the money its organizers sought while exposing bank workers, officers, bystanders, and Wells to the explosive.

The conspirators' instructions placed the bank visit inside a longer itinerary. At the McDonald's location, Wells recovered another note directing him elsewhere for supposed disarming information. Police intervention ended further travel. Officers confronted a bank-robbery suspect who carried a cane fashioned to resemble a firearm and wore a metal assembly at his neck. They could not assume his explanation was true, allow him to move freely, or know whether the device could be triggered by Wells or remotely by someone watching.

The federal appellate opinion later said police surrounded Wells and prevented him from continuing. That statement describes sequence, not blame. The people who designed the route knew that a robbery would provoke an immediate response. They created a scheme in which lawful detention could consume the wearer's remaining time. If the route could not tolerate police doing what police predictably do after an armed bank robbery, the defect belonged to the plan.

What the device communicated

The collar did more than contain explosive material. Its visible construction sent messages to several audiences at once. To bank employees, it supported the demand note and made the threat difficult to dismiss. To responding officers, it created uncertainty about whether Wells controlled the danger. To Wells, it made compliance a matter of survival. To the later public, it produced a disturbing image that risked replacing the human being with the object fixed around his neck.

Investigators could not begin with the story's eventual cast of defendants. They began with remnants, documents, locations, and the actions recorded during a short afternoon. They examined the collar, the timer system, the notes, the improvised weapon, the pizza order, the bank, the route, and the tower site. Nearly one thousand interviews followed. Each interview had a different evidentiary value. Some witnesses had direct knowledge, some repeated what another person said, some were implicated, and some had reasons to bargain.

The case therefore required more than discovering who could build a device. It required proof of agreement, purpose, preparation, and participation in federal offenses. The explosive connected the bank robbery to the destructive-device counts, but the government still needed evidence linking particular people to the planning and use. Technical findings could establish how the collar worked. They could not, by themselves, identify every conversation that preceded its construction.

The cane Wells carried added another layer. It was presented as a weapon during the robbery, yet the collar made Wells simultaneously appear threatening and threatened. Those roles are not mutually exclusive in the physical facts. A coerced person can carry out conduct that terrifies others. Bank employees could not be expected to solve the coercion question while facing the demand. The later legal inquiry could acknowledge their danger without deciding that Wells freely chose every act.

The Roden investigation

The path to the federal defendants did not proceed directly from the bank. It turned through the killing of James Roden. Diehl-Armstrong shot Roden in August 2003 after he objected to the robbery plan and threatened to go to police, according to the account accepted in the federal litigation. William Rothstein helped place Roden's body in a freezer at Rothstein's house and disposed of items and evidence associated with the killing.

After the bank robbery failed, Diehl-Armstrong pressed Rothstein to dispose of the body. Rothstein instead contacted police in September and disclosed the homicide. Investigators arrested Diehl-Armstrong, and the state prosecution ultimately produced her guilty plea to third-degree murder and abuse of a corpse. She received a state sentence of seven to twenty years. That judgment concerned Roden's killing, not the federal bank case that followed.

Roden's death mattered to the robbery prosecution in several ways. It supplied evidence of the plan's origin, showed what could happen to someone perceived as a threat to secrecy, and explained why investigators searching Rothstein's property found material connecting the household to the collar plot. It also created evidentiary danger. A jury deciding the federal charges could not simply treat a prior homicide conviction as proof of every new accusation. The prosecution had to connect the histories under the rules governing relevance and prejudice.

Rothstein died of cancer in July 2004 and was never convicted in the collar-bomb case. His death did not convert investigative conclusions about him into a verdict. It also meant that the federal jury did not receive his account through live testimony tested by cross-examination. Records and other witnesses had to carry the parts of the chronology that survived him.

Kenneth Barnes entered the investigation through the Roden case as well. After seeing coverage of Diehl-Armstrong's arrest, he contacted the coroner's office and helped identify Roden. Police questioned him, and he disclosed information about his own involvement in the bank plan. His cooperation was consequential, but cooperation is not the same as disinterest. He faced serious exposure and eventually pleaded guilty. The defense was entitled to ask whether the benefits he sought affected his testimony.

Planning and motive

The Third Circuit's account placed the early planning in 2003. Diehl-Armstrong had received an inheritance after her mother's death and believed her father's spending would diminish money she expected eventually to receive. The appellate record said she approached Barnes about killing her father and offered \$100,000. She also discussed robbing a PNC branch, believing the bank facilitated the father's spending.

That account came from the evidence accepted at trial and described on appeal. It explains the government's motive theory without turning motive into an element that replaces proof. A desire for inheritance money does not itself establish participation in a bomb robbery. The prosecution still had to show the charged agreements and acts. The evidence about meetings, the timers, the target bank, the device, and participant statements supplied that connection.

The planned demand of \$250,000 reflected the amount the group hoped to obtain, not the bank's actual payout. The plan involved placing a

bomb on someone sent inside, giving that person an apparent hostage explanation if caught, and removing a witness if the bomb killed him. Prosecutors described Wells as having attended some planning, but they also acknowledged that his position may have changed when the collar was attached and Rothstein threatened detonation.

That transition is central because criminal agreement must be voluntary. A participant who agrees to some conduct does not thereby consent to being killed. Nor does evidence of earlier knowledge resolve whether he understood the device would be live, whether he expected a harmless prop, or whether he retained any practical choice after it locked. The public record contains testimony on both sides, and no trial of Wells resolved the conflict.

The family evidence matters within that limit. Relatives testified or maintained that Wells was ambushed and forced into the collar. Their position challenges the cooperating witnesses and the government's partial-participation theory. Family advocacy is not a judicial finding, but neither is it a fact that can be erased by repeating the indictment's allegation. A responsible account states who advanced each version and recognizes that death prevented Wells from giving his own sworn account.

Charges delayed by investigation

The July 2007 indictment arrived nearly four years after the explosion. Delay in a complex case can reflect the difference between suspicion and evidence capable of surviving trial. Investigators had to compare inconsistent witnesses, identify the device's makers and suppliers, and determine which statements could be corroborated. The FBI described the work as a joint investigation with the Pennsylvania State Police and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives.

The indictment charged armed bank robbery, using a destructive device during a crime of violence, and related conspiracies. Charges are formal accusations. In 2007, they did not yet establish that Diehl-Armstrong or

Barnes had committed the offenses. Barnes converted accusation into judgment by pleading guilty. Diehl-Armstrong required a trial.

Barnes pleaded guilty to conspiracy and destructive-device charges. His plea admitted his own criminal responsibility and exposed him to federal punishment. It also made him available as a witness with firsthand knowledge. Jurors could consider his criminal role, the terms and expectations surrounding cooperation, consistency with earlier statements, and confirmation from other evidence.

The structure of federal liability explains why the case was not simply a state homicide prosecution for Wells's death. The target was a federally insured bank, the robbery involved federal statutes, and the collar was alleged to be a destructive device used in furtherance of a crime of violence. The death increased the gravity, but the charged offenses followed the robbery conspiracy and device use.

Competency before guilt

Diehl-Armstrong's federal trial could not proceed until the court determined she was competent. Competency asks whether a defendant has a present ability to understand the proceedings and assist counsel. It does not ask whether she has a mental-health diagnosis, whether the charged conduct was rational, or whether a jury will accept an insanity defense.

In January 2008, the district court found her incompetent and committed her for hospitalization and treatment. The Bureau of Prisons later reported that it believed competency had been restored. After a hearing, the court found her competent in April 2009. Three mental-health experts testified. The court credited the government's expert and relied as well on its observations of Diehl-Armstrong in the courtroom.

On appeal, the Third Circuit applied clear-error review to the factual competency determination. It did not decide the issue anew. The district judge had used the correct legal test and had a reasoned evidentiary basis for crediting one expert's assessment. A diagnosis of hypomania,

bipolar disorder, or personality disorder did not automatically answer the functional question. The appellate court therefore upheld the finding that she could understand the proceedings and assist her defense.

That procedural history prevents two common distortions. The initial incompetency ruling was not an acquittal and did not mean the case ended. The later competency finding did not declare her free of mental illness. It established only that the criminal process could continue at that time under the constitutional standard.

Statements before indictment

Before federal charges, Diehl-Armstrong initiated meetings with investigators and offered information about the robbery. She later sought to suppress those statements, arguing that their use violated her Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The timing controlled the appellate result.

The Sixth Amendment right at issue attaches when adversarial judicial proceedings begin, through indictment or a comparable formal step. The challenged meetings occurred before the federal indictment and before adversarial proceedings in the bank case. The Third Circuit therefore held that the particular constitutional right had not attached.

That conclusion did not create a general rule that police may use any statement obtained by any means. Other protections govern voluntariness and custodial interrogation. It meant the Sixth Amendment theory Diehl-Armstrong advanced did not require suppression on the facts before the court.

The distinction also shows why the state Roden case and the federal bank case could not be treated as a single undifferentiated prosecution. Representation or charges concerning one offense do not necessarily attach the offense-specific Sixth Amendment right to a separate, uncharged federal conspiracy. The appellate court applied that doctrine to the dates and proceedings in the record.

Trial management and appeal

Trial began on October 15, 2010. After the prosecution rested, the defense asked for a continuance so that an expert witness could return from travel abroad. The district court denied the delay but allowed the possibility of testimony by video. The defense did not use that option. The jury convicted Diehl-Armstrong on all counts.

The continuance issue on appeal required deference to trial management. Courts consider the efficient administration of the case, inconvenience to participants, reasons for delay, and prejudice to the defense. The Third Circuit found no abuse of discretion. The witness's travel was known, and an alternative method of testimony had been offered.

The district court imposed life imprisonment plus 360 months. The additional term reflected separate statutory punishment, even though ordinary description often shortens the result to a life sentence. The Third Circuit affirmed in November 2012. Its opinion addressed competency, the pre-indictment statements, and the requested continuance. Affirmance meant those identified errors did not justify disturbing the judgment; it did not certify every sentence spoken by every witness as true.

Diehl-Armstrong died in federal custody in 2017. The conviction had already become final through direct review. Her death ended the possibility of completing the life sentence but did not vacate the verdict. It also did not settle the unresolved question of Wells's earliest involvement, which was not essential to the judgment against her in a form that bound his family or his estate.

The words used for Wells

Public accounts often demand a single noun: victim, robber, accomplice, or hostage. The evidence resists that simplicity. Wells unquestionably entered the bank and presented the demand. He unquestionably wore a functioning device attached by others and died when it exploded. The government alleged some advance participation while acknowledging that lethal coercion may have changed his role. His family maintained there was no knowing participation at all.

Calling him only a robber suppresses the coercion and the absence of any conviction. Calling every act entirely involuntary can go beyond the contested record of earlier meetings. The most accurate language follows time. Before the collar was attached, the extent of his knowledge remains disputed. After it was attached and a threat of detonation was made, he acted under an immediate lethal constraint. At the roadside, he warned police and asked for help while the device continued counting down.

The bank employees were victims of an armed threat regardless of that dispute. Wells was the person killed by the conspirators' device. Roden was killed in the effort to preserve secrecy around the emerging plan. Those propositions coexist. The case does not require diminishing one harmed person to recognize another.

The surviving legal judgments identify Barnes's admitted participation and Diehl-Armstrong's proven participation. They do not produce a verdict against Rothstein, who died before prosecution, or Wells, who died before charges. Careful history keeps those procedural boundaries visible, even when a widely known case has acquired a settled popular storyline.

Engineering as evidence

The collar was a constructed system rather than a single commercial explosive. Its metal components, locks, wiring, timers, and explosive charge reflected access to tools and a sequence of assembly.

Investigators could examine design choices for what they revealed about skill, materials, and intended use.

Engineering evidence has limits. A component purchased or possessed by a suspect can support connection, but mass-produced parts do not uniquely identify a builder. Tool marks and fabrication methods require reliable comparison. The fact that Rothstein had taught shop made him an investigative focus, but occupation alone could not prove he made or attached the device.

The device also contained decoy or confusing features intended to slow understanding. For officers at the roadside, appearance could not reveal whether every wire was functional or how much time remained. Bomb technicians must assume a device is live until it is rendered safe, and distance is part of protecting officers and the public.

Later reconstruction could proceed slowly in a controlled setting. The response scene allowed no such luxury. This difference explains why hindsight about cutting a lock or wire is unreliable. An action that seems obvious after laboratory analysis may have killed Wells or others if attempted without that knowledge.

The timer's duration became part of the coercion analysis. A route that could not be completed within the programmed interval suggested that the promised escape was illusory. Yet proving exact feasibility required assumptions about starting point, traffic, compliance, and whether all instructions were genuine. The strongest statement is that the design and route created an extreme, perhaps impossible, survival problem.

Following the money that was not obtained

The robbery yielded \$8,702, while the plan contemplated \$250,000. Investigators had no large pool of proceeds to trace through spending, deposits, or division among conspirators.

That failure shifted emphasis toward planning evidence. Meetings, statements, relationships, timers, the pizza order, the target branch, and motive became more important than a conventional trail of stolen money.

The government's theory connected the desired proceeds to Barnes's proposed payment for killing Diehl-Armstrong's father. The evidence therefore joined two contemplated crimes: a bank robbery to produce funds and a proposed contract killing to secure inheritance expectations.

No killing of the father occurred. That fact limits the account. The murder proposal helped explain motive and agreement in the bank case, but it must not be described as a completed homicide.

Roden's killing was completed and separately adjudicated. The prosecution argued that silencing him protected the emerging plot. The state conviction established Diehl-Armstrong's responsibility for that death, while the federal jury considered the surrounding evidence under instructions governing its use.

Cooperators and corroboration

Barnes's testimony opened the conspiracy from the inside. Such testimony is often indispensable because secret agreements rarely produce neutral eyewitnesses. It is also vulnerable because the witness has admitted criminal conduct and may hope to reduce punishment.

Jurors can evaluate a cooperator through prior statements, plea terms, inconsistencies, opportunity to know, and external confirmation. Details that only a participant would likely know become more persuasive when physical evidence matches them.

The prosecution still bore the burden as to Diehl-Armstrong. Barnes's plea did not shift that burden or create a presumption against her. Defense counsel could expose benefits, prior crimes, motives, and contradictions.

The appellate opinion's summary reflects the verdict winner's evidence. It is not a transcript of every defense challenge. A narrative built from it should describe what the jury accepted while avoiding the claim that no contrary evidence existed.

Rothstein's death deprived both sides of live testimony. Investigators could use admissible statements under applicable rules, but a dead declarant cannot be cross-examined. The case therefore illustrates how delay can both strengthen an investigation through patient corroboration and weaken it through the loss of witnesses.

The limits of a competency finding

Competency litigation drew public attention because Diehl-Armstrong's behavior and diagnoses were conspicuous. The legal test remained narrow: present ability to consult with counsel and rationally understand the proceeding.

A person can be eccentric, difficult, symptomatic, or mentally ill and still be competent. Conversely, intelligence and fluent speech do not guarantee competency. Courts rely on expert evaluation, observed behavior, records, and the defendant's ability to engage the case.

The initial finding of incompetency showed the safeguard functioning. Proceedings paused while treatment occurred. The later finding showed competency is not fixed for all time. It can be restored, lost, and reassessed.

The appellate court reviewed for clear error because the district judge heard the experts and observed Diehl-Armstrong. That standard does not mean competency findings are beyond scrutiny. It recognizes that a paper record is a poorer vantage point for evaluating live testimony.

Nothing in the finding establishes her mental condition during every planning meeting in 2003. Competency to stand trial in 2009 concerned ability to proceed then, not criminal responsibility six years earlier.

A case transformed by repetition

The collar-bomb case became the subject of books, documentaries, podcasts, and online theories. Each retelling can make disputed claims feel settled through familiarity.

Popular narratives often compress the distinction between indictment, trial evidence, appellate summary, and family challenge. They may also treat the visual novelty of the device as entertainment. The court record demands a slower approach.

The judgment against Diehl-Armstrong is not a theory. It followed a jury verdict and survived appeal. Barnes's guilt rests on his plea. Wells's advance role remains disputed because no adversarial judgment determined it. Rothstein's alleged role never produced a conviction because he died.

Those four procedural statuses should not be blended into a cast list of equally proven conspirators. The same evidence can be strong historical support without having been reduced to a judgment against every named person.

The most durable account is therefore less cinematic. It identifies dates, actions, charges, and decisions; acknowledges what the camera recorded; and refuses to turn Wells's death into a puzzle whose only purpose is surprise.

The roadside image

Television cameras recorded Wells sitting on the pavement while officers waited for the bomb squad. The explosion then became part of broadcast history. Images from those minutes are often used to introduce the case because they communicate danger immediately.

Their evidentiary and ethical uses differ. Video can confirm Wells's location, posture, visible collar, police distance, and timing. Replaying death is not necessary to prove those points.

The camera also compresses the response into a single field of view. It may not show dispatch communications, bomb-squad travel, perimeter work, or the information officers had at each moment. Viewers who know the outcome can imagine an obvious rescue that responders could not safely identify in real time.

Law enforcement faced competing risks. Approaching could trigger a device or place additional people inside the blast area. Keeping distance left Wells alone while time passed. Allowing movement could endanger the public and continue a bank robber's escape.

No later conviction transferred authorship of that dilemma to the officers. The conspirators designed a plan in which every ordinary police response increased pressure on the person wearing the collar.

Wells's words that the bomb was real and time was short remain part of the record. They need not be dramatized with reconstructed tone. Their plain meaning carries enough force.

Investigative patience and public pressure

Nearly four years passed before the federal indictment. During that period, the case attracted theories that outran verified evidence.

A long investigation can look inactive from outside because grand-jury work, laboratory comparison, witness evaluation, and corroboration are not public. Premature accusation can alert participants, contaminate witnesses, and commit investigators to a weak theory.

The Roden discovery gave police a route into the relevant circle, but it did not instantly solve every role. Barnes's eventual cooperation had to be checked against the scene and the physical design.

Diehl-Armstrong's voluntary contacts with investigators generated

statements whose admissibility later became an appellate issue.

The delayed indictment reflects the burden of transforming a remarkable event into charges against identified people. The government ultimately presented enough evidence for a guilty plea and a jury verdict.

Public fascination continued after judgment because one question remained unresolved: what Wells knew before the collar was locked. The persistence of that question does not mean the entire prosecution was inconclusive. It marks the boundary between proved conspiracy and a deceased man's disputed starting role.

Status

Brian Wells died when the explosive collar detonated after the August 2003 bank robbery. Kenneth Barnes pleaded guilty in the federal conspiracy. Marjorie Diehl-Armstrong was convicted at trial, received life imprisonment, and died in custody in 2017. Wells's degree of initial knowledge remains disputed; the record supports that he was under lethal coercion once the device was attached.

Sources from the edition

Notes on sources

Principal sources are the published Pennsylvania appellate opinions, federal appellate and Department of Justice records, FBI archival material, Pennsylvania State Police information, and the Erie County District Attorney's June 2026 account of the Rogers cold-case investigation.

Sources were checked through September 2026. Current custody, sentence, and open-investigation claims require verification before reissue.

Principal records

1. Federal indictment, trial, sentencing, and appellate records concerning Marjorie Diehl-Armstrong and Kenneth Barnes; FBI collar-bomb archive. 2. Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 195 WDA 2021. 3. Commonwealth v. Robison, 741 WDA 2021. 4. Commonwealth v. Green, 425 WDA 2018. 5. Commonwealth v. Marsh, 448 Pa. 292 (1972). 6. Commonwealth v. Pursell, 46 Capital Appeal Docket (1999), and related direct review. 7. Commonwealth v. Brown, 478 Pa. 628 (1978). 8. Erie County District Attorney and Pennsylvania State Police account of the Lonene Rogers investigation, published June 2026.

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